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UNFAIR LISTS AS INDUCEMENTS TO SECONDARY
BOYCOTTS UNDER SECTION 8(b)(4)(A) OF THE
TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
LABOR unions use a variety of weapons to force employer compliance with
their demands. The most widely known economic weapons are the strike,
the picket line, and the boycott.' A less publicized but effective instrument
of union pressure is the "unfair" or "We Do Not Patronize" list. This list
usually names employers with whom the union is engaged in labor disputes,
but does not indicate the nature of the dispute, the issues involved, or what
action union supporters might take against the "unfair" employer.3 The
list may be posted on union bulletin boards, distributed to local unions to
be read at meetings, published in community or union newspapers, or sent
or personally delivered to those having business relations with the listed
employer.4
Like the picket line, the unfair list is commonly used today to publicize
the existence of a labor dispute: it may stimulate direct community action,
such as a consumer boycott; it may keep potential workers from seeking
employment with the listed employer.3 For such purposes, unfair lists are
1. See SMITH, LABOR LAW 217 (1953); R-yxoips, LABOR EC~O:wOICS A,.n L'rXv
REATioxs 287 (1949).
2. For a discussion of the use of "unfair" lists, see Denver Building & Construction
Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755, 756, 761 (1949). The NLRB there noted that "the
unfair listing of a primary employer is a traditional weapon used by labr organizations
in direct support of a primary labor dispute." See also LAr,LE, Boyc.,rrs A:D TuE
LABOR ST uGGLE 115-25 (1913), and WOLMNIAN, Tim BOOrr I,: A!E.cA': Tmvz
Uxioxs (1916), for the early history of the unfair list and its ue in the United States.
3. For an explanation of the unfair list and an indication of its use and effectiveness,
see Elliott v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 91 F. Supp. 690, 693
(XV.D. Mo. 1950).
4. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 93 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951) (list
implemented by union meetings and resolutions, and by telephone calls and letters to the
members); Spokane Building & Construction Trades Council, 89 N.L.R.B. 1163 (19.0)
(Council distributed unfair and "'Ve Do Not Patronize" lists quarterly among its affili-
ated locals with request that they distribute them among memkvrs) ; Denver Building &
Construction Trades Council, 82 N.L.R.B. 1195 (1949) (Council circulated list to its
constituent unions and placed employer's name on the union bulletin board) ; Bricklayer-s,
Stone 'Masons, Marble Masons, & Tile Layers Benevolent & Protective Union, 82
N.L.R.B. 228 (1949) (copies of minutes of Council sent to affiliated unions and somc-
times read at union meetings, and union newspapers notified); United Brotherhuod of
Carpenters & Joiners of America, 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949) (Building Trades Council
sent copies of its minutes to affiliated unions; sometimes read at union meetings).
5. The Board has stated that it believes the purposes of an unfair list include putting
"pressure on the named employer by diverse means, including .vithdrav.al of services
from him by union members and by other union-minded employees, refusal by such
employees to accept his employment, product boycott by union employees and . . . the
public . . . , sympathetic refusal by union employers to trade with him, and the dis-
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probably most effective in small, local disputes.6 Although conflicts in large
industries generally receive full publicity from the regular mass media of
communication, disputes in small enterprises attract little public attention.
Consequently, the unfair list is often the most important means of spreading
news of the union's grievance against an employer. In an area where most
of-the workers are union members and most families are union-minded, the
listing of a small employer can result in pressures from consumers, workers,
and business associates that force him to accede to union demands.1
Prior to the Taft-Hartley Act, unfair lists were also used rather effec-
tively, especially in the construction industry, to implement secondary boy-
cotts.8 By urging members of other unions or locals to force their employer
-through a concerted refusal to work-to stop doing business with the
persons classified as "unfair," the union could bring into play a powerful
economic weapon. But that weapon was capable of injuring completely
innocent employers as well as those involved in the dispute.0 In response to
this problem, Congress in 1947 enacted Section 8(b) (4) (A) of the Taft-
Hartley Act.'0 That section outlaws any union activity which "induces or
concerting effect of widespread publicity of the labor dispute." Denver Building & Con-
struction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755, 756 n.1 (1949).
6. LAIDLER, BOYCOTTS AND THE LABOR STRUGaLE 119, 124 (1913).
7. See WOLMAN, THE BoycoTT IN AMERICAN TRADE UNIONS 82-3 (1916).
8. See United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 81 N.L.R.B. 802, 821
(1949) (concurring opinion of Chairman Herzog) ; Secondary Boycotts in Labor Dis-
putes, Management Review, February, 1938, p. 52; Labor Boycotts Grow, Business Week,
November 20, 1937, p. 23.
"The primary or simple boycott is one in which the aggrieved party resolves not to
patronize a firm or firms or its product and appeals to its friends to withhold their patron-
age. The usual secondary boycott is one in which, in addition to the above, coercion, loss
of business, etc., are resorted to or threatened to cause third parties to sever business
relations." MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 583 (1945).
The secondary boycott has been most often employed as a weapon to compel an
employer to recognize or bargain with a union. See MILLIS & BROWN, FaoMs TarL WAG-
NER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 277-9 (1950). This device has often been considered un-
lawful by the state courts, since it is felt that the interest of the union in promoting its
organization does not justify the damage incurred by the "disinterested" employer
involved. See, e.g., Bricklayers', Masons' & Plasterers' Int'l Union of America v. Sey-
mour Ruff & Sons, Inc., 160 Md. 483, 154 Atl. 52 (1931) ; Pacific Typesetting Company v.
International Typographical Union, 125 Wash. 273, 216 Pac. 358 (1923). MILLis & BIIowN,
op. cit. supra, at 460.
9. See 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947); NLRB, LEGiSLATIvE HISTORY OF THE LABOR
MANAGEMENT REI.ATIONS ACT, 1947, pp. 583, 658, 1056 (1948).
10. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158 (b) (4) (A) (Supp. 1951) : "It shall be an
unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents ... (4) to engage in, or to
induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted
refusal in the course of their employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or
otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-
employed person to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or other
person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products
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encourages" workers to engage in secondary boycotts. Since unfair lists are
repeatedly used in connection with such secondary boycotts, the National
of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any
other person; ...Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection [8(b)] shall be
construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises of any
employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are engagel
in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees -whom such employer
is required to recognize under this Act."
Insofar as lists are concerned, the above section seems in direct conflict with § 8(c),
which provides that any mere expression of arguments or opinions, oral or written, is
neither itself an unfair labor practice nor evidence thereof under any of the provisions
of § 8. 61 STAT. 142, (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (Supp. 1951). The Supreme Court
has ruled, however, that § 8(c) is inapplicable to § 8(b) (4) (A). "'The protection
afforded by Section 8(c) of the Act to the expression of "any views, argument or
opinion" does not pertain where.., the issues raised under Section 8(b) (4) (A) turn on
official directions or instructions to a union's own members.' 82 N.L.R.B. at 1213."
National Labor Relations Board v. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 341
U.S. 675, 690-1 (1951). "The prohibition of inducement or encouragement of secondary
pressure by § 8(b) (4) (A) carries no unconstitutional abridgment of free speech."
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v. National Labor Relations Board,
341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951).
The literal interpretation of § 8(b) (4) (A) might outlaw even primary picketing in
many cases. But the Board has ruled that primary picketing is not within the scope of
this Section. United Electrical, Radio & Machine WNorkers of America, 85 N.L.R.B.
417, 418 (1949).
The publication and circulation of an unfair list may subject the union to civil
liability for libel. In Paducah Newspapers v. Wise, 247 S.W.2d 9S9 (Ky. 1951), the
Kentucky Court of Appeals decided that unions may be liable for falsely charging an
employer with being unfair, "where there exists no controversy or other circumstance
which would reasonably justify the intentional damage of the employer's business."
Id. at 992, cert. denied, 343 U.S. 942 (1952).
If a violation of § 8(b) (4) (A) is charged, § 10(1) requires the officer or regioral
attorney to whom the matter is referred to obtain a temporary injunction in a federal
district court, providing his investigation discloses reasonable cause for believing the
charge is true. In considering relief, the district court will then apply general quity
doctrines. See, e.g., LeBaron v. Los Angeles Building & Construction Trades Council,
84 F. Supp. 629 (S.D. Cal.), aff'd, 181 F.2d 449 (9th Cir. 1949). The decision of the
court to issue or not to issue the injunction will have no effect on the subsequent full-
dress hearing of the § 8(b) (4) (A) violation charge by the NLRB under § 10(c). See
United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Local No. 74, 80 N.L.R.B. 533, en! orecment granted,
181 F.2d 126 (6th Cir. 1948), afftd, 341 U.S. 707 (1951). If the NLRB finds a violation
of 8(b) (4) (A), § 10(c) enables it to issue a cease and desist order; and § 10(e)
empowers the Board to petition any United States court of appeals for the enforcement
of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. For a detailing
of these procedures, see 'vr E, LAw OF L AO RETIONS 85-6 (1951). Section 303 (a) also
makes unlawful the activity which constitutes an unfair labor practice under § 3(b) (4)
(A) ; and § 303(b) provides that any person injured in his business or property by any
violation of § 303(a) may sue in any United States district court or any other
court having jurisdiction of the parties for damages sustained and the cost of the suit.
The remedy of damages under § 303 appcars to be completely independent of those
attaching to the § 8(b) (4) (A) complaint. See International Longshoremen's & Ware-
housemen's Union v. Juneau Spruce Corp., 342 U.S. 237 (1952). But see Xote, 0l YALC.
L.J. 745 (1952).
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Labor Relations Board has been forced to examine the validity tinder
Section 8(b)(4)(A) of various uses of such lists.
The first "unfair listing" case to face the NLRB under Section 8(b)(4)
(A)-the Wadsworth case-involved the listing of a secondary employer.11
A majority of the Board viewed that list as "a direction or an appeal to
union men not to handle any goods or perform any services for [the secon-
dary employer]."12 Although the opinion did not explicitly make the listing
illegal per se, the Board a month later in the Osterink case declared that the
mere "unfair" listing of a primary employer ipso facto constituted an illegal
encouragement or inducement to a secondary boycott.13 Thus it appears that
at that time virtually any use of an unfair list would have been unlawful. 14
But in 1949 in the Graumnan case,'5 the NLRB overruled-at least as to the
listing of primary employers-its per se doctrine of illegality.1 In Grau-
,m, the Board reasoned that Section 8(b) (4) (A) prohibits only induce-
ment of secondary employees as a group; it does not prohibit devices for
publicizing a dispute which are aimed at persuading customers or union
members in general to bring pressure upon secondary employers, even when
some secondary employees are included among those who are influenced by
such publicity.. 7 The Board felt that the listing of an employer directly
involved in a dispute is not necessarily for the purpose of promoting pro-
11. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 81 N.L.R.B. 802
(1949), enforcement granted, 184 F.2d 60 (10th Cir. 1950).
12. Id. at 816. Members Houston and Murdock dissented on the ground that free
speech guarantees in § 8(c) protect all lists. Id. at 822.
13. Bricklayers, Stone Masons, Marble Masons, & Tile Layers Benevolent & Pro-
tective Union, 82 N.L.R.B. 228, 230 (1949). Member Houston dissented in part. Id.
at 233. Member Murdock took no part.
14. See 15 NLRB ANN. REP,. 145 (1950).
15. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755 (1949).
16. "[A] majority of the Board [Chairman Herzog and Members Houston and
Murdock] finds that the Council's action in placing and maintaining Grauman on its
unfair list did not, in and of itself, constitute inducement and encouragement within the
meaning of Section 8(b) (4) (A)." Id. at 757. Members Reynolds and Gray, dissenting,
found the listing not a violation per se, but said the Board should determine legality by
examination of the purpose of listing in each case. Id. at 764.
17. The NLRB has referred to inducing or encouraging customers, employers,
and the general public as legitimate objectives of unfair listing in holding the listing
of a primary employer not to be illegal per se. Denver Building & Construction Trades
Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755, 756 n.1 (1949). Section 8(b) (4) (A) speaks only of induce-
ment or encouragement of secondary employees. But see Capital Service, Inc. v.
National Labor Relations Board, 31 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. Man.) 2326 (9th Cir. 1953),
where the picketing of the premises of the secondary employer (a retailer) requesting a
consumer boycott of the products of the primary employer, being sold by the retailer,
in order to bring pressure upon the employees of the primary employer to become
unionized, was held to violate § 8(b) (1) (A). 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(b)(1)(A) (Supp. 1951). That section makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union "to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
section 7 ... ." The rights guaranteed in § 7 include the right to refrain from
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scribed action by secondary employees. Instead, the Board noted that
"[p]ublication of the fact as to the existence of a primary dispute by means
of the unfair list invites secondary action no more than does primary picket-
ing."' But the NLRB declared that while promulgation of such a list will
not itself constitute a violation of the Act, the existence of the list could be
used, as it was in Grauman, as the occasion for illegal inducement by union
officials. 19 Thus, under the position taken by the majority, overt acts of
inducement in addition to mere publication of the list would seem essential
to make out a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A). A minority of the Board
was of the opinion that the legality of a list in each case should depend on
the union's purpose in promulgating it.:0
In applying the Graumnan decision, the NLRB has thus far approved most
uses of lists of primary employers which have not been accompanied by
specific independent union action, or conversation, advocating secondary
action. It has ruled that posting a list naming a primary employer on union
bulletin boards and distribution of a list to affiliated unions to be read at
meetings are permissible methods of publicizing a dispute.*" The Board
has apparently upheld these uses on the ground that they do not seek to
"induce" secondary employees as a group, but are aimed at promoting direct
consumer action among all union members in a particular locality.2 Further-
more, implicit in the Board's opinions seems to be the view that the mere
forming, joining, or assisting labor organizations. Of ST-T. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (Supp. 1951).
The Board has also held that inducing an employer or supervisor, even %,hcn such
action takes place in the presence of employees, is lawful. Lumber & Say mill Vorcri
Union, 87 N.L.R-B. 937, 939 (1949). This ruling may reveal a device for evading thu
statute.
18. Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.1. 755, 757 (1949).
19. Ibid.
20. Members Reynolds and Gray dissented. They felt that primary empluyer listing
would be illegal if primarily intended to induce or encourage employees of a secondary
employer to act in the prohibited manner. Id. at 761-2.
21. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 93 N.L.R.B. 33t5 (1951)
(distribution of list via circulation of minutes and resolutions of union meetings) ; Spo-
kane Building & Construction Trades Council, 89 N.L.R.B. 1163 (1950) (distribution
quarterly by council of lists of primary employers among its affiliated locals with the
request that they distribute them among their members) ; Denver Building & Con-
struction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755 (1949) (primary employer's name placed
on union bulletin board and list circulated to affiliated unions). In all three cases, how-
ever, the union or its agents engaged in "other conduct" which was found to violate
8(b) (4) (A).
22. See Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755, 756-7
(1949), where the Board majority opinion enumerates the objectives of primary em-
ployer listing other than inducing or encouraging secondary employees and emphasizes
the analogy of an "unfair" list to primary picketing, regarding both as devices principal-
ly intended as means of advertising a labor dispute. This view v.as reiterated in
Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 93 N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1951).
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issuance of a list is an ineffective method of achieving proscribed secondary
action.23 Although the case has not yet arisen, the publication of a list in a
newspaper, which should have even less impact vis a vis secondary employees,
would probably be held legitimate. Only in those situations where it has been
necessary for a union agent to "remind" workers at a secondary establishment
that their employer was doing business with a listed employer has the Board
found a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A).2
Since Wadsworth was not only the first unfair listing case to reach the
Board under Section 8(b) (4) (A) but has also been the only case involving
the listing of a secondary employer, it is difficult to tell the present status of
such secondary listing. Wadsworth was expressly followed and extended to
become a doctrine of per se illegality in the primary listing situation in
Osterink.2 5 But the latter case was overruled by the Board in Grauman-at
least as to primary listing.26 And although the Board does seem to place some
emphasis in at least one recent case on the fact that a primary employer was
listed,27 its general approach makes it doubtful that it would apply a pcr so
doctrine of illegality to the listing of a secondary employer.28 In such a situa-
23. The NLRB has never explicitly stated that one of the reasons it has held that
these means of distributing a list are lawful is that they do not appear to be effective in
causing secondary employees to exert pressure which 8(b) (4) (A) was designed to
prevent. Nevertheless, this may be an important factor contributing to the conclusion
of legality.
24. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 93 N.L.R.B. 336 (1951)
(telephone calls to individual workers) ; Spokane Building & Construction Trades
Council, 89 N.L.R.B. 1168 (1950) (union agents said to secondary employees: "you
wouldn't want to work with non-union men on the job here, would you."); Denver
Building & Construction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755 (1949) (union agent re-
minded workers that they were working beside employees of an "unfair" employer);
United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 81 N.L.R.B. 802 (1949)
(employee of secondary employer asked by union representative if "he knew what the
situation was"). See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 93 N.L,
RIB. 336, 337 (1951).
25. 15 NLRB ANN. REP. 145 (1950) (discussing Bricklayers, Stone Masons, Marble
Masons, & Tile Layers Benevolent Protective Union, 82 N.L.R.B. 228 (1949)).
26. "To the extent that our finding herein is inconsistent with the decision of the
Osterink case finding that the unfair listing of a primary employer ipso facto con-
stituted a violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A), or may itself be found to be illegal because
of other evidence showing improper use of the unfair list, that decision is hereby over-
ruled." Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755, 757 (1949).
27. "[W]e do not adopt the Trial Examiner's finding that the Respondents violated
Section 8(b)(4) (A) of the Act by maintaining Kimsey, the primary employer, on
their 'unfair' or 'We Don't Patronize' lists. . . ." Spokane Building & Construction
Trades Council, 89 N.L.R.B. 1168, 1169 (1950).
28. Members Reynolds and Gray, two of the majority of three holding primary
employer listing an ipso facto violation of 8(b)(4)(A) in Osterink, dissented in
Graumnan, and expressed the opinion that the problems presented by primary and secon-
dary employer listing are substantially the same. "The only question to be resolved in
either instance then is whether the evidence shows that the unfair listing was ibtcnded
1116 [Vol. 62
tion, however, it is possible that the Board might place somewhat more severe
restrictions upon the uses the union might make of the list than if only a
primary employer were listed.
Despite the original fears of the Gram;an dissenters that the approach
adopted by the Board would give inadequate consideration to the purpose for
which an unfair list was used in each case, the NLRB's application of Section
8(b) (4) (A) appears thus far to have carried out the legislative policies of
the secondary boycott proscriptions. Only individual employees, acting inde-
pendently, can lawfully attempt to influence their own employer to stop doing
business ith another employer who is engaged in a primary dispute. And
independent action of that sort is extremely difficult to bring about merely
by the publication of an unfair list. An additional outside stimulus is custom-
arily needed for the purpose of making the workers aware that they are not
in fact acting alone.2 9 Thus, under most circumstances in which a secondary
boycott is a real possibility, there is "other conduct" 30 accompanying an un-
fair list; and it is that conduct which the Board generally finds to be an
unlawful inducement, or encouragement, to a secondary boycott.
It is possible, however, that a purely mechanical application of the NLRB's
present formula for determing legality might permit some unions, through
skillful use of the unfair list, to effectuate secondary boycotts with impunity.
Many unions have by-laws prohibiting their members from working directly
or indirectly for "unfair" employers or employers who have been placed on
an unfair list.3 ' Although such provisions are in practice generally not self-
executing, a tight local union might make the mere listing of a primary em-
ployer on a union bulletin board the signal for concerted action by members
against secondary employers. In such a case, the listing itself might represent
to induce or encourage employees of secondary employers %%ithin the meaning of §
8(b) (4)(A). Only to the extent that the proof of illegality in the case of the listing
of a primary employer may be more difficult than in the case of the listing of a
secondary employer, do we believe that a distinction is warrantedL" (Empha!is sup-
plied.) Denver Building & Construction Trades Council, 87 N.L.R.B. 755, 763 (1949)
(dissent).
29. See note 24 supra.
30. "Other conduct" has most often consisted of direct communications to employees
of secondary employers while on the job. See note 24 supra.
31. The constitution of the Bricklayers International provides that no member shall
work for anyone employing non-union employees in any branch of trade within the
jurisdiction of the International or work for a subcontractor who takes a contract from
any person or firm employing non-union employees or work for any firm or pers-in
either directly or indirectly who has been placed on the unfair list by the International.
See Trial Examiner Scharnikow's enumeration of such regulations of various unions,
Bricklayers, Stone Masons, Marble Masons, & Tile Layers Benevolent & Protective
Union, 82 N.L.RB. 228, 239-40 (1949). Such provisions of union constitutions or by-
laws, like a union's designation of an employer as unfair, are not illegal tcr so but may
furnish the inducement or encouragement for a strike or concerted refusal to ark.
Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. National Labor Relations Board, 31 L,. RE.. REP. (Ref.
Man.) 2361, 2363 (7th Cir. 1953).
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a "verbal act" precipitating a secondary boycott.8 2 The Board's current ap-
proach may be sufficiently flexible to meet such a situation. But present
emphasis upon the specific acts of union inducement often used in connection
with unfair lists may lead the Board to overlook the possible importance of
the full context in which the list is used. Furthermore, the NLRB now runs the
risk of undue emphasis on stare decisis. Merely because a particular use of a list
-for example, distribution of the list to be read at the meetings of affiliated
unions- is held lawful in one case, does not mean it should be lawful in
all cases.33
Although the Board has blocked most attempts to use the unfair list as
an occasion for a secondary boycott, it has left the way open for at least
two uses of the list which seem to contravene the policy of Section 8(b) (4)
(A). The first results from the NLRB decision in the Comway case.04
An employer had entered into a contract with his employees under
the terms of which the employees could refuse to handle the products-
labeled "hot cargo" 35-- of any other employer with whom the union had
a dispute. Acting under the contract, the workers achieved in effect a secon-
dary boycott. The Board opinion, which was affirmed by the Second Circuit,
took the position that the secondary employer had consented in advance to
boycott the primary employer.3 6 And the proscription in the Act against bring-
32. As long ago as 1911, the Supreme Court recognized this potentiality in unfair
lists. Justice Lamar, speaking for the Court in the famous Bucks Stove case, stated:
"In the case of an unlawful conspiracy, the agreement to act in concert when the
signal is published, gives the words 'Unfair,' 'We do not patronize,' or similar ex-
pressions, a force not inhering in the words themselves, and therefore exceeding any
possible right of speech which a single individual might have. Under such circum-
stances, they become what have been called 'verbal acts' . . . ." Gompers v. Bucks
Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911).
33. The language of at least one decision appears to indicate that the Board may
be moving toward such a mechanical stare decisis approach which ignores possible
refinements and distinctions. Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen, 93
N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1951).
34. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949).
35. "Hot cargo" is the term applied to goods or materials produced by an em-
ployer with whom the union is engaged in a labor dispute. A "hot cargo" list usually
ennumerates the products manufactured by such an employer. WERNE, THE LAW
oF LABOR RELATIONS 239 (1951).
36. The fact that this contract was entered into prior to the passage of the Taft-
Hartley Act was immaterial to the decision. According to the Board: "[T]here is
nothing in the express provisions or underlying policy of Section 8(b) (4) (A) which
prohibits an employer and a union from voluntarily including 'hot cargo' or 'struck
work' provisions in their collective bargaining contracts, or from honoring these
provisions." International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 982-3 (1949).
Chairman Herzog and Member Reynolds disagreed with the Board majority
ruling that the contract in this case constituted a defense to the unfair labor practice
charge. Id. at 983 n. 33, 995.
The Conway case was appealed to the Second Circuit, where the Board decision was
affirmed both as to the determination that an oral "closed-shop" contract was in ex-
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ing pressure for a secondary boycott by "a strike or concerted refusal" did
not prevent the union from achieving a similar result through collective
bargaining procedures. One result of the Conway decision may be that a union
can with impunity send an unfair list to secondary employees and recommend
that a secondary boycott be effected, provided the secondary employees have
a Conway-type contract to support their action.37
Whether or not the action taken under the contract was with the consent
of the employer, as the Board felt, such a use of Conway would seem in
conflict with the objectives of the statute. Even though such a contract is
in effect, the union of either the primary or secondary employees would
probably have to communicate with the workers of the secondary employer in
order that a strike or refusal to handle the goods of the primary employer may
be effecuated. And should the technique used for such communication be such
that it would constitute an "inducement" in violation of Section 8(b) (4) (A)
in the absence of a Conway-type contract, there would seem to be just as
much of an inducement in its presence. Furthermore, even assuming this
activity literally complies with 8(b) (4) (A), the Conway-type contract itself
should probably not be recognized, since it authorizes activity "repugnant to
the basic public policies of the Act."'3 s
istence and enforceable, and as to the holding that the contract and the union activities
based thereon did not violate 8(b) (4) (A). Rabouin v. National Labor Relations Board,
195 F.2d 906 (2d Cir. 1952). Judge Clark, for the majority, upheld the XLRB on the
latter point on the strength of omission from the House version of the Taft-Hartley
Bill of a rule against threats to strike (H.R. 3020, O0th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(14), 12(a)
(3) (1947)). 195 F.2d at 912. Judge L. Hand dissented, finding that the union ad
repudiated the "closed-shop" contract and that this rendered consideration of the other
points of the case unnecessary. Id. at 913-4.
37. As a result of the Conway decision, the union which has secured such a contract
may employ direct action to achieve a secondary boycott. It seems to follow from this
determination that the sending of an unfair list by the union engaged in the primary
dispute to a union which possesses such a contract, or its members, inducing them to
exercise their contractual rights, likewise might be viewed as not prohibited by § 8(b)
(4) (A). For a critical discussion of the Conway decision, see Tow:er, A Perspect've
on Secondary Boycotts, 2 LAs. LJ. 727, 737 (1951); Note, 38 VA. L REv. 431, 4S9-
90 (1952).
38. Member Reynolds, concurring in part and dissenting in part: "To the e:.tent
that these contract provisions authorize such activity, they are repugnant to the basic
public policies of the Act. As the Board in the public interest is charged with the
duty of preventing unfair labor practices, contracts which are repugnant to the Act
and which conflict with this duty of the Board must obviously yield." International
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 972, 995 (1949). It should be noted, however,
that Congress did not prohibit secondary employers from voluntarily refusing to do
business with a disputing primary employer; nor did it prohibit direct union action
to influence a secondary employer. The only action outlawed was inducement of secon-
dary employees to coerce their employer. Hence, if an employer consents to a Corcay-
type contract, it is at least arguable that not even the p,.,Iicy of Ib t4A.(A) hat
been violated.
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A second method by which an unfair list may be used to effectuate a secon-
dary boycott is by sending the name of a primary employer to secondary em-
ployees, urging them to refuse to perform any work at the premises of the
primary employer. The Board decided in the Pure Oil case 31 that a "hot
cargo" list, which encouraged workers of a secondary employer not to handle
goods of the primary employer at the latter's place of business, did not violate
8(b) (4) (A), since it merely invited action at the situs of the primary dispute.
Activity which takes place at the plant of the primary employer has generally
been regarded as direct action-comparable to primary picketing or the
fundamental right to strike-and hence not prohibited by 8(b) (4) (A). 40
And the Board felt that this doctrine should properly be extended to cover
such use of a "hot cargo" list.
In the Rice Milling case, 41 decided in June, 1950, the Fifth Circuit, revers-
ing a decision of the NLRB, rejected the Board's view that the locus of any
attempt t6 induce or encourage action directed toward a secondary employer
should make any difference. It found that union pickets at the site of a
primary dispute violated Section 8(b) (4) (A) by inducing two truck drivers
working for a secondary employer not to cross their picket line.4a The
Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit on the ground that the inducement
was not to concerted action as required by Section 8(b) (4) (A). 43 But the
39. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local Union 346, 84 N.L.R.B. 315 (1949).
40. See United Electrical, Radio & Machine Workers of America, 85 N.L.R.B.
417 (1949), where the premises of the primary and secondary employer were tile
same, though the employees of the secondary employer used a separate entrance,
and picketing by the union of the primary employees at this adit was found lawful
under the primary situs rule.
For further insight on what is considered primary situs by the Board, see Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, 90 N.L.R.B. 401 (1950); International Brother-
hood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949) ; Note, 38 VA. L. Riv. 481, 486 ct seq. (1952).
41. International Rice Milling Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 183 F.2d 21
(5th Cir. 1950), rev'd on other grounds, 341 U.S. 665 (1951).
42. "The statute clearly provides a remedy for the type of conduct engaged in by tile
union, without resort to any distinction between primary and secondary activities.
4• 
. .
"To allow the Board to rule such activity as prohibited by the statute not to be a
violation thereof, simply because it occurred in the vicinity of the struck employer's plant,
would render the section ineffective and insufficient." Id. at 26-7. The Seventh Circuit
is likewise in disagreement with the Board's primary-secondary distinction. Joliet Con-
tractors Ass'n v. National Labor Relations Board, 31 LAB. REL. Rr. (Ref. Man.) 2361,
2364 (7th Cir. 1953). For critical discussion of the primary situs test, see Note, 38 VA. L.
REv. 481, 486-8, 495 (1952).
43. National Labor Relations Board v. International Rice Milling Co., 341 U.S. 665
(1951). Appeal was taken on the limited question of whether the Fifth Circuit's finding
was correct that conversation and rock throwing directed toward the two truck drivers
by union members engaged in picketing the primary employer's plant violated §§ 8(b) (4)
(A), (B). The Supreme Court decided that the union's inducement or encouragement of
individual workers of secondary employers as they approached the primary picket line was
not aimed at concerted activity as prohibited by the statute, id. at 671, although the con-
[VCol. 621120
NOTES
Court did not pass on the validity of the Court of Appeals' "situs" holding.
And the NLRB's decision in the Newspaper Deliverers case,44 after the Fifth
Circuit opinion, indicates that it will continue to apply the primary situs test.
In xiew of the Supreme Court's holding in Rice Milling, virtually any non-
coercive persuasion by primary pickets of individual secondary employees
attempting to cross the picket line will probably escape the proscriptions of
Section 8(b) (4) (A). But the validity of direct appeals, outside a primary
picketing context, by which the union asks the workers of a secondary
employer not to perform any work at the premises of the primary employer
seems more questionable.45 Since directed to a group of employees, such
appeals would seem to be aimed at obtaining "concerted" action by almost any
definition. Furthermore, the language of Section 8(b) (4) (A) appears to
comprehend all forms of inducement to secondary workers to bring pressure
on their employers, without regard to the situs of either the inducement or the
concerted refusal to work. The right to picket is a recognized exception to
this prohibition. And although the Supreme Court's opinion in Rice Milling
was not based on the fact that the inducement involved amounted to an
integral part of the picketing, such a picketing rationale might be used to per-
mit peaceful persuasion by pickets even in a case where the required "con-
certed" action was present.46 But where there is attempted persuasion not by
certed activity question wvas apparently not even argued in the briefs. For criticism of
the concerted activity ruling, see Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Stri:es and
Boycotts-A New Chapter, 37 CoR-NE-LL L.Q. 235, 249-53 (1952).
44. Newspaper & Mail Deliverers' Union of New York & Vicinity, 90 N.L.R.B. 2135
(1950). The union was engaged in a dispute with the owners of subway newsstands, and
the primary situs rule was employed to justify the successful inducement of employees of
newspaper publishers not to make deliveries to the newsstands with u~hich the union was
engaged in a primary dispute.
45. The XLRB recognized this distinction and was careful in its brief for the Rice
Milling case to distinguish the facts of that case from those in the Pure Oil case, implying
that the legality of the union's activities in the latter case was more doubtful. Brief for
Appellants, pp. 47-8, National Labor Relations Board v. International Rice Milling Co.,
341 U.S. 665 (1951).
If the Supreme Court interprets inducement to concerted activity to mean induce-
ment of employees as a group, as it appears to have done in the Rice Milling decision,
many, if not most, secondary boycotts which a union of primary employees desires
may be effected by direct communication to one or a few secondary employees, without
infringement of 8(b) (4) (A). It is more probable that Congress intended, as the
Board has held, that "concerted" at most calls for inducement of mure than one
secondary employee. United Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, 81 N.L
R.B. 802, 818 (1949). See also Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Vorkmen, 93
N.L.R.B. 336, 337 (1951). For a recent interpretation of the "concerted" rcquir.ment as
laid down in Rice Milling, see Joliet Contractors Ass'n v. National Labor Relations
Board, 31 LAB. REL. REP. (Ref. -Man.) 2361 (7th Cir. 1953).
46. "[Picketing] consists of the stationing of one or more representatives of the
workers at a strategic point to perform one or more of several functions. Pickets . . .
may observe [the dispute] to see the extent of operations and the persons who come there
for business. They may also, by word of mouth, or signs or placards, seek to dissuade
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pickets but by union-sent letters or union notices which specifically ask the
employees of a secondary employer to refuse to work for their employer at
the situs of the primary dispute, the inducement cannot be said to be a legiti-
mate part of the right to picket. Unlike picketing and the normal persuasion
incident to picketing, inducement such as involved in Pure Oil is not an
integral part of the right to strike. And unlike the mere distribution of an
unfair list, such communication does directly exhort secondary employees to
take action against their own employers. Since the union action clearly falls
within the broad language of Section 8(b) (4) (A) and is not justified by any
exception to that provision, it should be held an unfair labor practice.41
Louis EMANUEL, lII
workers and others from entering the plant for purposes of business or from otherwise
doing business with the employer." RESTATniENT, TORTS § 779(2) (f), Comment (1939).
See also Koretz, Federal Regulation of Secondary Strikes and Boycotts-A New Chapter,
37 CORNELL L.Q. 235, 245 (1952).
47. The "fair" list-which names employers on amicable terms with the union-is a
third device which might be used to avoid the Board's secondary boycott rules. It is
usually distributed for display purposes to the "fair" employers themselves, or to those
likely to have business dealings with them. Since it only indirectly calls attention to union
disputes with employers omitted from the list, and probably is aimed more at customers
than at secondary employees, the "fair" list will undoubtedly be upheld if its legality
under 8(b) (4) (A) is tested. Recognizing this, and troubled by the litigation which "unfair"
lists have provoked, some unions are using "fair" lists with increasing frequency. In any
area where the "fair" list is a firmly established union weapon and workers check it
closely, it may promote a secondary boycott as effectively as more direct instigation, In
the large majority of cases, however, the use of the "fair" list seems to violate neither
the language nor the purpose of 8(b) (4) (A).
"Member of the Class of 1954, Yale Law School.
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